From K-Pop to Carnival: Could Trinidad and Tobago build its own cultural technology economy?

Cultural technology: How South Korea turned K-Pop and culture into a global economic powerhouse

Cultural technology transformed South Korea’s cultural heritage and popular entertainment into a globally competitive export industry, offering Trinidad and Tobago a compelling model for treating culture as economic infrastructure. The Korean Wave, or Hallyu, was not created by one government programme or one successful music group, but through decades of interaction between public policy, private investment, technology, talent development and international distribution.

The famous 1994 comparison between Jurassic Park and Hyundai exports helped persuade Korean policymakers that cultural products could possess industrial-scale economic value. After the Asian financial crisis, South Korea increasingly supported film, television, music, games and digital content as strategic industries.

Trinidad and Tobago possesses a remarkably rich cultural asset base of its own, including Carnival, steelpan, calypso, soca, chutney, tassa, mas, literature, cuisine, fashion and distinctive Indo-Caribbean, African, European and Indigenous traditions. A comparable long-term strategy could turn these assets into exportable intellectual property, tourism demand, technology businesses and international brands.

Key Takeaways

South Korea built cultural capacity through sustained investment, policy and private-sector execution.
K-pop succeeded because talent, production, technology and distribution were developed as one ecosystem.
Trinidad and Tobago already possesses globally distinctive cultural assets with significant export potential.
Treating culture as infrastructure could diversify foreign-exchange earnings beyond energy and tourism.
The strongest opportunity lies in building a Caribbean cultural technology ecosystem rather than copying K-pop.

The Jurassic Park moment that changed Korea’s economic thinking

In May 1994, South Korea’s Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology presented President Kim Young-sam with an argument that was deliberately provocative. The council used Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park as an illustration of the extraordinary commercial value that intellectual property could generate internationally.

The frequently repeated comparison was that the film’s total sales revenue was equivalent to the foreign sales of approximately 1.5 million Hyundai automobiles. Contemporary Hyundai exports were nowhere near that volume annually, making the comparison equivalent to more than two years of automobile exports.

The precise financial comparison needs qualification. Jurassic Park eventually generated more than US$1.1 billion worldwide when later releases are included, while its original worldwide theatrical gross was approximately US$978 million. The Korean box-office return was only a small fraction of that figure. The Korean policy argument was therefore about the potential global commercial value of cultural intellectual property, including international exploitation and merchandising, rather than Korean cinema receipts alone.

That distinction actually makes the lesson more relevant to Trinidad and Tobago. A cultural industry should not be evaluated according to the amount of money spent or earned inside the country alone. Its economic value extends into foreign licensing, streaming, publishing, music royalties, merchandise, tourism, advertising, fashion, food, education, technology and international investment.

The significance of the Korean comparison was psychological as much as financial. Hyundai represented industrialisation, engineering, factories and exports. Jurassic Park represented something different: an intellectual property asset capable of travelling around the world without requiring a new factory in every market.

Korea began to recognise that cultural products could operate as export infrastructure.

From industrialisation to cultural technology

South Korea had spent decades building a developmental economy around manufacturing. Samsung, Hyundai and other conglomerates became symbols of the country’s transformation from poverty and war devastation into an advanced industrial economy. Culture initially occupied a very different position in that economic hierarchy.

The 1994 Jurassic Park calculation helped change the conversation, but it did not immediately produce the Korean Wave. Korea’s cultural transformation involved deregulation, technological development, private entrepreneurship, investment in creative talent and progressively more sophisticated export strategies.

An instructive example came from Samsung’s attempt to invest in DreamWorks SKG in the mid-1990s. Reports differed over the precise scale of the proposed Samsung investment, with figures reaching hundreds of millions of dollars and, in some accounts, approaching US$900 million.

Negotiations ultimately failed, partly because of disagreements over creative control and corporate culture. Spielberg later recalled the repeated appearance of the word “semiconductor” during discussions, illustrating the difficulty of applying an industrial conglomerate mentality directly to a creative enterprise.

A related family company, Cheil, ultimately became an investor in DreamWorks, putting approximately US$300 million into the studio for a minority stake and Asian distribution rights. The episode demonstrated that Korean capital understood the potential strategic value of entertainment, even though the organisational model had to evolve.

That evolution is central to the concept of Cultural technology.

The phrase became particularly associated with Lee Soo-man and SM Entertainment. Rather than treating a performer as an isolated artist, the system treated entertainment as a repeatable production process involving talent discovery, training, music production, choreography, visual identity, language preparation, marketing and international distribution.

This did not remove creativity from the process. It created infrastructure around creativity.

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The Asian financial crisis created a strategic opening

The decisive acceleration came after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998. South Korea required an IMF-led rescue package of approximately US$55 billion to US$58 billion and entered a period of severe economic restructuring.

President Kim Dae-jung, inaugurated in 1998, responded with an economic strategy that included culture as a potential growth industry. He became associated with the description “culture president“, while government support for cultural industries expanded substantially. One frequently cited measure shows the cultural-industry budget increasing from approximately US$14 million in 1998 to US$84 million by 2001.

The 1999 Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries provided a formal legislative foundation. Its purpose explicitly included establishing the basis for cultural industries, strengthening competitiveness and contributing to the national economy. Its definition extended beyond traditional arts to film, music, games, broadcasting, animation, design, performance, crafts and digital cultural content.

This was a fundamental policy shift.

Government was no longer viewing culture solely through the lens of preservation, public entertainment or grants for artists. It was increasingly being understood as an economic system involving production, financing, intellectual property, technology, skills, distribution and exports.

The distinction matters enormously.

A country can have excellent musicians without having a music industry. It can have talented filmmakers without having an international film sector. It can have Carnival without possessing a global Carnival economy.

Infrastructure connects talent to markets.

How K-Pop became a production system

K-pop’s eventual global success was therefore built on a sophisticated human-capital system.

Entertainment agencies developed highly selective trainee programmes in which prospective performers could spend years receiving instruction in singing, dancing, performance, languages, media behaviour and physical presentation. The exact number of applicants and debut rates varies substantially by agency and period, but the broader reality is clear: the system created an unusually competitive pipeline for developing professional performers.

This is Cultural technology in practical form.

The system combines artistic judgement with data, production expertise, market research, branding, choreography, multilingual communication and digital distribution. A successful group is not simply a collection of talented singers. It is the output of an ecosystem involving producers, composers, choreographers, stylists, videographers, engineers, managers, lawyers, digital platforms and international marketing specialists.

Technology then multiplied the effect.

South Korea’s rapid expansion of broadband infrastructure coincided with the growth of digital media. YouTube, social media, streaming platforms and mobile communications eventually allowed Korean entertainment companies to bypass many traditional international distribution barriers.

The result was an extraordinary export model.

K-pop no longer needed a foreign broadcaster to decide whether Korean music deserved international exposure. A performance could reach millions of viewers directly.

The economics also became increasingly interconnected. Music promoted fashion. Fashion promoted cosmetics. Television promoted tourism. Film promoted food. Performers promoted consumer brands. Fans travelled to concerts. Tourists visited filming locations. Korean language learning expanded alongside interest in entertainment.

Culture became an economic network rather than a collection of unrelated activities.

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K-Pop’s global numbers demonstrate the scale

The transformation is visible in global music markets.

In 2024, K-pop acts occupied nine of the top ten positions on the IFPI Global Album Sales Chart, with Taylor Swift the only non-K-pop artist in that group. The chart measures physical album sales and full-album downloads, making it particularly useful for demonstrating the purchasing power of highly organised global fandoms.

The broader Korean Wave has extended well beyond recorded music. Korean television dramas have become international streaming properties. Korean cinema has achieved major critical recognition. Korean games have become significant global products. Korean beauty products have established international distribution networks, while Korean food and fashion have benefited from the same cultural halo.

The crucial economic insight is that these sectors reinforce one another.

K-pop does not need to pay for every tourism benefit it creates. A television drama does not need to own a hotel to increase hotel demand. A celebrity does not need to manufacture cosmetics to influence cosmetics consumption.

The value propagates through the economy.

Trinidad and Tobago already has the raw materials

This is where the Korean experience becomes particularly interesting for Trinidad and Tobago.

Trinidad and Tobago does not need to invent a cultural identity. It already possesses one of the Caribbean’s most distinctive cultural ecosystems.

Carnival is internationally recognised. Steelpan is indigenous to Trinidad and Tobago and represents one of the world’s most distinctive musical inventions. Calypso and soca have influenced global popular music. Chutney and chutney-soca embody the country’s Indo-Caribbean heritage. Tassa, mas, storytelling, food, fashion, dance, literature and visual arts add further layers.

The country’s cultural diversity is itself an economic asset.

Port of Spain has been recognised by UNESCO as a Creative City of Music, with its musical identity encompassing calypso, chutney and soca. UNESCO reports that the city’s music industry employs more than 3,000 people and generates approximately US$10 million for the region. It also notes that Carnival has influenced hundreds of similar celebrations internationally.

These figures suggest that Trinidad and Tobago is not starting from zero.

The country already possesses globally recognisable intellectual property. The weakness is that much of this intellectual property has not been organised into a sufficiently integrated international export system.

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What would cultural technology look like in Trinidad and Tobago?

A Trinidad and Tobago version of Cultural technology should not attempt to manufacture a Caribbean equivalent of BTS.

That would misunderstand the Korean achievement.

The objective should be to build an infrastructure capable of repeatedly transforming local cultural talent into internationally marketable intellectual property.

The first requirement would be a national cultural technology strategy operating over 20 to 30 years rather than changing direction with every administration. Culture would need measurable economic objectives covering exports, royalties, international audiences, employment, tourism expenditure, intellectual-property ownership and foreign-exchange earnings.

The second requirement would be human capital.

Trinidad and Tobago has extraordinary artistic talent, but the ecosystem around that talent needs strengthening. Music production, songwriting, choreography, animation, cinematography, game development, costume design, fashion, digital marketing, entertainment law, intellectual-property management and international sales should be treated as professional disciplines.

A national cultural technology academy could connect secondary schools, the University of the West Indies, private studios and international partners.

The third requirement would be physical and digital infrastructure.

Studios, rehearsal spaces, theatres, recording facilities, film locations, post-production facilities, animation laboratories, costume workshops and digital archives should be regarded as productive infrastructure rather than discretionary cultural expenditure.

The construction of the Desperadoes Pan Theatre demonstrates what this approach can look like on a smaller scale. UNESCO reports that the facility cost approximately US$2 million and was designed not only as a performance venue but as commercial and cultural infrastructure capable of increasing exposure, encouraging economic activity and strengthening community participation.

The next step would be considerably larger.

Carnival could become a global cultural platform

Carnival provides perhaps the strongest foundation for a Trinidad and Tobago Cultural technology strategy.

The country’s Carnival is already an internationally recognised cultural phenomenon, encompassing music, costume, performance, competition, street theatre and tourism. Visit Trinidad describes J’ouvert, mas, Panorama, calypso and soca as integral components of the national Carnival ecosystem.

Yet much of the commercial value is concentrated in a relatively short annual period.

A Cultural technology strategy would extend Carnival into a year-round intellectual-property ecosystem.

Films and documentaries could tell the stories behind mas characters. Animated productions could introduce traditional characters to international children. Video games could incorporate Carnival environments. Fashion designers could develop globally distributed collections inspired by mas. Music companies could systematically export soca and calypso. Streaming platforms could distribute Carnival documentaries and original dramas. Digital archives could preserve performances while creating licensable historical datasets.

Even the economics of costumes could change.

Instead of treating costumes primarily as disposable annual products, designers could create internationally marketed fashion, collectibles, digital assets, museum exhibitions and performance wardrobes.

The same principle could apply to steelpan.

Steelpan is not merely a musical instrument. It is an extraordinary piece of Trinidad and Tobago intellectual and cultural heritage with potential applications in education, entertainment, instrument manufacturing, music technology and global performance.

Culture could help diversify Trinidad and Tobago’s economy

The economic argument becomes especially important for a country whose foreign-exchange earnings and fiscal capacity remain heavily influenced by hydrocarbons.

Culture cannot replace energy overnight, and policymakers should not pretend otherwise. Its value lies in diversification.

A barrel of oil is consumed once. Intellectual property can generate licensing income repeatedly across multiple territories and decades.

A song can earn royalties. A television series can generate licensing fees. A film can create tourism demand. A fashion design can produce international sales. A cultural festival can generate hotel, airline, restaurant and transport expenditure.

This makes cultural exports particularly attractive for a small economy.

UNESCO’s Creative Caribbean initiative explicitly frames cultural and creative industries as mechanisms for inclusive economic development, job creation and the production and distribution of cultural goods and services.

Trinidad and Tobago’s own cultural policy already recognises much of this potential. The National Cultural Policy 2020–2025 sought to leverage cultural products for economic potential and global penetration while strengthening infrastructure, supporting artists and entrepreneurs and establishing an integrated institutional framework.

The challenge is therefore not discovering the idea.

It is executing it at industrial scale and over a sufficiently long period.

The Korean lesson is about systems, not subsidies

The greatest mistake would be to interpret South Korea’s experience as evidence that governments can spend money on artists and automatically create global stars.

They cannot.

Government investment creates conditions. Private companies, creators and audiences determine whether those conditions produce commercially successful culture.

Korea’s success depended on experimentation, competition, technological infrastructure, international market intelligence and entrepreneurial risk. It also involved failures and significant social costs, including criticism of trainee conditions, entertainment-company power and the pressures placed on performers.

Trinidad and Tobago should therefore adopt the principle without copying every mechanism.

The country needs independent cultural entrepreneurs, transparent funding, competitive production companies and international partnerships. Public money should finance infrastructure, research, training, market access and projects with measurable potential rather than becoming a permanent substitute for commercial demand.

Intellectual-property ownership would be especially important.

If Trinidadian artists create globally successful characters, songs, films, formats and brands, the economic benefits should remain substantially connected to Trinidad and Tobago. A sophisticated cultural strategy would therefore require expertise in copyright, trademarks, publishing, licensing, collective management and international contracts.

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Trinidad and Tobago has a potentially powerful cultural export model

The Korean Wave succeeded because South Korea eventually understood that culture could function like infrastructure.

The country built systems that connected talent to production, production to technology, technology to distribution and distribution to international markets.

Trinidad and Tobago possesses many of the cultural assets that such a system requires. It has a distinctive identity, musical genres with international recognition, an extraordinary festival, a multicultural population, an English-speaking creative workforce and a diaspora that provides natural access to North American, British and Caribbean markets.

The missing ingredient is scale and coordination.

A serious national Cultural technology strategy could establish Trinidad and Tobago as a global Caribbean content hub, with Carnival as one pillar, music as another, film and television as another, and food, fashion, gaming, animation, heritage and digital media completing the ecosystem.

The objective should not be to make Trinidad and Tobago look Korean.

It should be to make the world increasingly interested in Trinidad and Tobago.

South Korea demonstrated that a nation does not have to possess the world’s largest population, the world’s largest domestic entertainment market or the world’s oldest cultural tradition to become a global cultural power. It needs distinctive intellectual property, disciplined production, technological infrastructure, human capital, international distribution and patient investment.

The 1994 Jurassic Park comparison mattered because it changed the question from whether culture was economically valuable to how much economic value culture could generate.

For Trinidad and Tobago, that question deserves an equally ambitious answer.

The country has spent generations producing culture organically. The next stage would be to build the infrastructure capable of exporting it systematically.

If roads, ports, electricity networks and telecommunications are considered essential economic infrastructure because they move people, energy, goods and information, culture deserves recognition as infrastructure because it moves ideas, identity, intellectual property and international demand.

South Korea built that system over decades.

Trinidad and Tobago could build its own.